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Over the past six years, a great stir in academic financial theory
(sometimes spilling over into practice) has been caused by the option
pricing model originally advanced by Black and Scholes (1973) and by
Merton (1973b). The reason for this stir is that strong results are derived
from what seem at first to be weak assumptions. While the weakness of
these assumptions is illusory, the model does make an important point:
The ability to trade securities frequently can enable a "few" multiperiod
securities to span "many" states of nature. In the Black-Scholes model
there are two securities and uncountably many states of nature, but
because there are infinitely many trading opportunities and, what is
crucial, because uncertainty resolves "nicely," markets are effectively
complete. Thus the punchline: Perhaps even though there are far fewer
securities than states of nature, nonetheless there is a complete (or nearly
complete) set of contingent claims markets. Perhaps, therefore, risk is
• allocated efficiently.
The purpose of this paper is to explore this idea and to attempt to see
what is important in determining the number of securities "needed" to
have complete markets. In this regard, the following two questions will
be addressed to some extent: (1) The Black-Scholes model has been
• criticized on the grounds that it takes as given that which any good
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economist would want endogenously determined: equilibrium pricesof
the few multiperiod securities. This is a valid criticism because those
prices are the critical data in determining whether markets are complete prices
To what extent, then, is it reasonable to suppose that equilibrium prices refinemet
will have the property required for complete markets? (2) In what sense thing
if any, is the Black-Scholes result robust? It will be seen that the propert space, in
required for complete markets concerns the very delicate fine structureof or more
the model. Other models that approximate the Black-Scholes model ina only wiq
standard sense do not possess this property. Do these other models have equilibri1
"approximately complete" markets? One hopes that the answer is yes. I4ere,
Otherwise, one either must be able to discern the critical fine structureor (1979). 1
must discard the conclusions of the Black-Scholes model for practical plete in
purposes. K versu
The paper is divided into two parts. The first part contains an analysis enibellis
of the basic issues in the spirit of Radner (1972). In section 6.2 a mul- The
tiperiod exchange economy with uncertainty is formulated. The economy 6.3,
afinite state space Il, a collection of agents, a finite set of a very If
dates t0,1,.. .,T at which agents consume, and an exogenously
specified information structure, which describes what information (all) these
agents know at each date. Formally, the information structure is a se- value
quence of nondecreasingly finer partitions of t =0,...,T}.The very
interpretation is that at date t, all agents know which cell of F, contains the and
true state and no more. There is a single consumption good which serves ing the
as numeraire. Finally, there are N "long-lived" securities that allow reasofli
agents to trade consumption between dates and states. Each security is a
contingent claim to consumption at the terminal date T. Markets where tioflS."1
these securities can be exchanged for each other and for the consumption propel
goodopenateachdatet,withp = =1,...,N,t =0,...
Ethe price process of the securities. A definition of an equilibrium for unlike
this economy is given, exactly as in Radner (1972). Every such equilib- discer
rium is given an alternate characterization, as an equilibrium in a De- The
breu-style economy where a (possibly incomplete) set of contingent
claims markets opens at date zero. ideahz1
The basic question is posed and answered in section 6.3: Under what appro
conditions will the corresponding Debreu-style economy be one with a sense
complete set of markets (so that the equilibrium allocation is Pareto analys
efficient)? A necessary and sufficient condition for this is: Fort <Tand A discus
EF,, let K(t,A) be the cardinality of {A' E A' cA}.Then it is Blacki
necessary and sufficient that for every t and A EF,, the span of the
conditional support of p(t+ 1) given w E A has dimension K(t,A). There- analysi
fore, a necessary condition is that N, the number of securities, must be at Sect
least K =max{K(t,A)}.This is illustrated by a simple example that will
makes the basic point: With N securities and T trading dates (t =








































While it is necessary for complete markets that K ￿ N, this is not
sufficient. The necessary and sufficient conditions involve the equilibrium
prices p, and this is clearly less than satisfactory on economic grounds. A
refinement is given in section 6.4 that is more satisfactory. Fixing every-
thing except the terminal payoffs of the securities (that is, fixing the state
space, information structure, and agents), "almost every" selection of K
or more securities (determined by their terminal payoffs) gives an econ-
omy with a complete markets equilibrium. (This presumes that an
equilibrium with a complete set of contingent claims markets exists.)
1-lere, "almost every" means a generic result in the sense of Radner
(1979). Thus, in determining whether markets are "likely" to be com-
plete in an economy with long-lived securities, the crucial comparison is
K versus the number of securities N. This section closes with several
embellishments on the basic model.
The qualitative insight to be gained from the analysis in sections 6.2,
6.3, and 6.4 is clear: A few securities that are frequently traded may span
a very large dimensional space of contingent claims. Markets may be
complete, and it is possible that risk is allocated efficiently. But how are
these "may be's" to be converted into more positive statements? What
value of K is appropriate for modeling purposes? Might it be that K is
very much larger than N, and yet markets are approximately complete
and risk is allocated approximately efficiently? These questions concern-
ing the robustness of the analysis are extremely difficult for two related
reasons. The analysis does not indicate what (if anything) will suffice for
"approximately complete markets" and "approximately efficient alloca-
tions." The analysis identifies K as the crucial piece of data, and K is a
property of the fine structure of the model. If conditions necessary for
"approximate completeness/efficiency" involve the datum K, then one is
unlikely to be able to apply this analysis with any confidence—the task of
discerning the "true" value of K defies the imagination.
The following •sort of result is therefore sought. If one economy
approximates a second idealized economy in a coarse sense and if the
idealized economy has "complete markets," then the first economy has
approximately efficient equilibrium allocations. The key is to make the
sense of approximation as coarse as possible, in order to make the
analysis as robust as possible. The remainder of the paper is devoted to
discussion of this type of result and in particular to convergence to the
Black-Scholes model that dominates the financial literature. The issues
raised are very delicate and difficult mathematically, and therefore the
analysis given is preliminary at best.
Section 6.5 concerns the idealized economy to which other economies
will converge: the Black-Scholes model. The use of continuous time
creates difficulties. Both the sense in which this model represents a
Radner equilibrium and the sense in which it is a markets"206 David M. Kreps 207
equilibriumarenot straightforward. These difficulties are resolvedas in structure
Harrison and Kreps (1979),andthe section closes with brief discussiono0 nijeS,
the inadequacies of this resolution.
A convergence result is proved in section 6.6. Within a certain ities for
framework, sequences of models that converge to the Black-Scholes ger(197k.
model have asymptotically efficient equilibrium allocations. The modeof There1
convergence required is such that a sequence can converge Without tioflS
convergence of the "fine structure" of the economies: In each economy those
along the sequence, K is very much larger than N. (In fact, K =andN alike"
= 2for each economy.) This shows that for approximate efficiency, the K market
versus N comparison may be misleading. cautioU
This convergence result is a step in the right direction, but it suffers pie,
from some severe deficiencies. Chief among these is that the framework Whe
of the result is very restrictive—the state space, information structure, tiofl iS
and agents are all fixed along the sequence. (What changes along the Grossm
sequence are the dates at which trading takes place and, perhaps, the eXampl
equilibrium prices.) It ought to be the case that this sort of convergence Thro
result holds in a much less restrictive setting. But when one attempts to tending
obtain analogues in wider contexts, difficulties arise. For if the
state space changes along the sequence, then so does the commodity half of
space and so (perforce) must the agents. How then is one to define "spaflfl
"asymptotic efficiency"? Section 6.7 discusses where these difficulties lie, Journa
why in some sense they cannot be completely overcome, and how they
might be partially finessed. "Answers" are not provided in this section. stantly
Rather, the aim of the discussion is to indicate limitations of both the
result in section 6.6 and any possible extension and to spur research that
1
willculminate in an approximation theory more adequate than that which 6.2
is given here.
Section 6.8 presents a brief summary of the main points of the paper, Con
together with a list of weaknesses and questions left unanswered by the tainty.
analysis. There
The general topic addressed here has a long history in the literature,
areview of pertinent contributions may help put things in perspec- exogeq
tive. The mode of analysis of a multiperiod exchange economy follows partiti
Radner (1972) and his definition of an equilibrium of plans, prices, and agent
price expectations. This definition is implicit as well in the simpler setting throu
of Arrow (1964). Arrow (1964) and Guesnerie and Jaffray (1974) discuss F0 is
circumstances under which a Radner economy has a "complete" set of genera
markets—Arrow analyzes a two-period economy, and Guesnerie and
Jaffray extend Arrow's idea (that at each date there should be a complete
IS
set of financial claims for the next date) to a multiperiod setting. When a
Radner economy does not have "complete markets," inefficiencies may R
result, and these may be inefficiencies even relative to the existing market Ofl207 Multiperiod Securities and the Efficient Allocation of Risk
ed as in structure. On this and other points concerning incomplete Radner econo-
;sion mies, see Hart (1975). Several papers, noting that there are "fewer
securities than states," have discussed the role of options on those secur-
certain itieS for completing markets. On this point, see Breeden and Litzenber-
ger (1978), Friesen (1979), and Ross (1976).
node of There is a chunk of literature that seeks to show how efficient alloca-
vithout tions can arise with few securities using arguments very different from
onomy those used here. In these papers, agents are assumed to be "sufficiently
and N alike" (for example, identical subjective probability estimates, no non-
'',the K market income, and HARA class utility functions with identical risk
cautiousness) so that complete markets are unnecessary. See, for exam-
suffers pie, Wilson (1968).
tework When some of the information may be privately held and/or informa-
icture, tion is endogenously generated and is costly, a host of difficulties arise:
ng the Grossman (1977) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) are two excellent
)S, the examples of the huge literature on this topic.
rgence Throughout this paper only exchange economies are considered. Ex-
ipts to tending the analysis to questions of production and productive efficiency
if the involves nontrivial complications, even in the simple models of the first
nodity half of the paper. These problems are roughly those pointed to in the
define "spanning" literature: see Diamond (1967), Stiglitz (1972), and the Bell
ies lie, Journal Symposium on the Optimality of Competitive Capital Markets
v they (1974). Because of the multiperiod setting here, where agents are con-
ction. stantly changing their portfolio holdings, the papers of Grossman and
th the Stiglitz (1980) and Hart (1979) are especially important.
h that
which .. . 6.2Equilibrium in a Multiperiod Exchange Economy
)aper, Consider the following model of an exchange economy with uncer-
by the tainty. There is a finite number of states of the world, indexed by o.E
• There is a finite number of time periods, indexed by t =0,1,...,T.All
• ature, agents in this economy have access to the same information which is
rspec- exogenously specified. This information is represented by a sequence of
)llOws partitions of t =0,...,T}.The interpretation is that at time
;, and agents know which cell of F1 contains the true state. Information increases
etting through time: is at least as fine as F. For simplicity, it is assumed that
iscuss F0 is trivial and thatis the discrete partition. The if-field of events
set of generated by F1 is denoted F1.
and There is a single consumption good which cannot be stored. This good
iplete is consumed at each date, and the amount consumed at date t can vary
a across cells ofthus, the consumption space for agents is X =
may where is the space ofF1 measurable real valued functions
on fl. The notation x =(x(0),...,x(T))is used for a generic element of
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X, with x(t, w) denoting the value of x(t) in the state w. Vectors Xwillbe
interpreted as net trade (rather than total consumption) vectors for
agents.
The agents in this economy are indexed by i1,.. .,I.Each agentis
characterized by a subset X'X, representing feasible net trades for
agent i, and by a complete and transitive binary relation onx'
representingagent i's preferences among net trades. Itis assumed
throughout that each X' is "comprehensive upwards," in the sense that if
xE X'ancjjfx' E +x' E
X'. Moreover, it is assumed that each X' contains the origin, and that
eachis strictly increasing in the sense that for x and x'0 as above,
X+Xl >1x.
There are N assets or securities in this economy. These are claims to
(state contingent) consumption at date T. They are indexed by n
1,...,N.Security n entitles the bearer (on date T) to units of the
consumption good at date T if the state is o. The net supply of these
securities is zero. It is assumed that for every state there is one of these
securities that pays off a nonnegative amount in every state and a strictly
positive amount in that state.
At each date tT and in every state, markets open in which these N
securities can be traded for one another and for the consumption good.
The price (in units of the consumption good) of security n at date tin state
w will be denoted by These markets are frictionless—there are
no transaction costs and no restrictions on short sales. A price system is a
vectorstochasticprocessp = =1,...,N,t =0,...,T,w E fl}
with p(t) F1 measurable for each t.
The agent's problem in this economy is to manage a portfolio of these
N securities in order to obtain for himself the best possible net trade
vector of state contingent consumption. This is formalized as follows. A
trading strategy is an N dimensional vector stochastic process 0 =
such that 0(t) is F1 measurable for each t. The interpretation is
that w) is the number of shares of security n held from date t until t + 1
in state w. (For t =T, is the number of shares from which the
dividend is received.) The constraint that 0(t) is F1 measurable is the
natural information constraint. If prices are given byp = then the
strategy 0 results in the following net trade vector in state contingent
consumption:
(2.1)x(0,p) =(x(0;0,p),...,x(T;0,p)),where




































x(t;0,p) =(0(t—1) —0(t)).p(t)fort =1,...,T—1, and
x(T;0,p) =(0(T—1) —0(T)).p(T)+0(T)'d.
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r will be A net trade bundle x E Xis said to be feasible for agent i at prices p if x E
tors for and if there exists a trading strategy 0 such that x _<x(0,p). The set of
feasible net trade bundles for i at prices p is denoted X'(p).Notethat this
agent is definition contains an implicit assumption of free disposal and that x E
ides for X'(p)impliesthat x satisfies the appropriate budget constraints on net
on trades.
.ssumed An equilibrium for the economy described above is a price system p
e that if and, for i =1,...,I,net trade bundles x' and trading strategies 01 such
that
:nd that I 1 1
above (2.2a) x x E X for all z,






)f these Condition (a) says that x' is a feasible net trade for i and that x' is feasible
strictly if i adopts the trading strategy 0. Condition (b) says that taking pricesp as
given, agent i can do no better than x'. Conditiçn (c) is the market
hese N clearing condition. It says that securities markets clear exactly. Note that
good. . thistogether with (2.2a) and (2.1) imply that 0, or markets for the
in state consumption good clear. This is an equilibrium of plans, prices, and price
ere are expectations in the sense of Radner (1972), assuming rational expecta-
em is a tions on the part of agents as to the prices that will prevail at subsequent
w E ￿1} dates contingent on states.2
The following alternative characterization of an equilibrium will be
f these useful. Fix a price system p. Define
trade
)W5. A M' ={xK X: x =x(0,p)for some trading strategy 0).




is the (As shall be claimed in the following proposition, (2.3) is necessary for
en the any equilibrium where agents' preferences are strictly increasing in the
ingent sense above.) Then define
(2.4)M={xEX:x=m'+(r,O,...,O)form'EM'andrER}
and
(2.5) m(m' + (r, 0,...,0))=rform' E M' and r K R.
nd
Clearly, Mis a subspace of X. Moreover, (2.3) guarantees that 'rr: M—* R
is a well-defined, strictly positive linear functional.210 David M. Kreps 211
1
Proposition1. If {p, (x1, isan equilibrium, then (2.3) holds, and
eitherkI
(2.6) x' E Mfl andx' ismaximalin{x E Mfl X' :
Conversely, if p satisfies (2.3) and if there exist x' satisfying (2.6) (for M
anddefined from p) and x'=0,then there exist 0' such that that
{p,(x',01)} is an equilibrium. (3.2)
The proof is straightforward and is left to the reader with one hint. In
the converse half, suppose x' and pare given. By strict monotonicity of A
thereexist 0' such that x' =x(0',p).Let 0' =0'for i1 and 01 given t
= =x1.Of course, =0. are at
The interpretation of this proposition is clear. Fix an equilibrium IS
{p,(x',O')}, and define M and ir from p by (2.4) and (2.5). Imagine an {span{J
economy in the style of Debreu (1959) where at date zero agents can every
purchase any net trade bundle x E Mat the price ii(x). Note well that if M induct
X, this is not an economy with a complete set of contingent claims be gIv1
markets. Of course, agent i faces two constraints in this Debreu-style parent
economy: The x he selects must lie in X and must satisfy the budget Exa
constraint 'rr(x)0. Then (2.6) says that prices 'rr are equilibrium prices in t =
thiseconomy with corresponding equilibrium allocation (x'). tions
Interpreting the converse half is a little trickier. Fix a Debreu-style
economy with contingent claims markets for claims in some M, and let
beequilibrium prices and (x') the corresponding equilibrium allocation.
The proposition does not guarantee that there are prices p that give the
same equilibrium allocations in an economy with the given long-lived
securities. Rather, if there are prices p that give rise to M and the Thus,






Suppose that for an equilibrium price system p, the corresponding Dc
space M is X. Then the equilibrium allocation (x1) is an equilibrium
allocation for a Debreu-style economy with a complete set of contingent =0
claims markets and therefore is Pareto efficient. Thus, it is natural to seek strati
conditions that yield M =X. nothi
Define for t < T and A E 1
(3.1) K(t,A) =cardinality{A'E :A' CA},
and K =max{K(t,A);t<T,A E F}.
Inwords, K(t,A) is the number of "subcells" of A in Thisis a q
measure of the amount of information that might be received by date t + 1 Ft if at date t the event A is known to prevail: If K(t,A) =1,then no new irs
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information will be received. If K(t,A) =.2,then new information of an
S. and either/or type will be received, and so on.
Proposition 2. Let p be an equilibrium price system, and let M be
'1M
defined from p by (2.4). A necessary and sufficient condition forM =Xis
hthat that for each t < T and A E F;,
(3.2) dimension{span{p(t+ 1,w);co EA}} =K(t,A).
In A paraphrase of this condition is that the conditional support of p(t+ 1)
dJ given that jJ E A consists of K(t,A) linearly independent vectors. There
o
areat most K(t,A) vectors in this conditional support (because p(t+ 1)
isF,÷1measurable). Thus, K(t,A)isan upper bound on dim
ibrium .. . .
'One {span{p(t+ 1,w); oEA}}.The condition is that this upper bound is hit in an every instance. The proof of this proposition involves straightforward
induction on T. Rather than work through the details, a full example will
claims be given which should make both the proposition and its proof trans-
u-st le parent.
udet Example. Suppose that there are six states {w1,... and four dates
t =0,...,3. The exogenous information structure is given by the parti-
tions
u-style F0 = =
dlet ir
:ation. F2 =
yethe F3 ={(tUi},{w2}, {u3}, {w4}, {co6}}.
'-lived
;d the Thus, K(1,{wi,w2}) =Iwhile K(2,{wj,o2}) =2.Suppose that there are
(with two securities whose dividends at date 3 are as in table 6.1.
Consider two possible equilibrium price systems arising from these
data, as depicted in figures 6.la and 6.lb. The column vectors in these
event trees give the prices of the two securities as a function of the date
and state. For example, in figure 6. la the column vector (9,4.2)' which is
starred is interpreted to mean pi(2,o4) =.9and p2(2,w4) =4.2.Note
that the tree structure corresponds to the information structure.
)fldlng Does M =Xin either or both cases? The answer is yes if and only if for
brium everyt>OandA E =(x(0),...,x(T)) that is given byx(s)
ingent , =0for st and x(t) =1Ais in M. That is, there must exist a trading
o seek strategy that produces one unit of consumption in event A at date t and
nothing at any other date-event pair. Begin by asking if this is true for t =
1and for every A E F1. In each case the answer is yes—the two possible
values of p(i) are linearly independent; thus, there exist (01,02) and
suchthat = and
(p1(1),p2(1))' = This clearly suffices. Now proceed to ask
4s isa thequestionfort =2.ForA ={wi,w2}thereisnoproblemineithercase.
frt+1 But matters are not so simple for A ={w3,w4}.In case a it can be done:
new First, solve
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(03 (04 4
Payoffof security #1—d,() 1 1 1 1 1 1
Payoff of security #2—d2(•) 1 2 3 6 4 5
(01,02)•(.9,4.2)'=land(01,02)•(.909,4.1)'=O.
This can be done because the two column vectors are linearly indepen-
dent. Let be the solution. Next, solve
(O[,02).(.81,l.26)' =Oand(01,02)(.81,3.75)'
This can be done by the first step—the solution, denote it is
just a scalar multiple of Then the strategy of starting with
") atdate zero, changing to (0,0) at date one if {tOi, w2} occurs and
to if {o.3,w4,*o5,o6} occurs, and then consuming everything at
date two yields one unit of consumption at date two if and only if {03,C04}
occurs.
But consider case b. One cannot solve
(Ot,82)(.9,4.2)' =land
because the two column vectors are linearly dependent. Thus, if one
consumes one unit at date two and nothing at date three when
occurs, one must consume something either at date two or at date three
when {w5,w6} occurs.
By inductively applying this sort of logic, one can see that M =Xin
case a (as predicted by proposition 2), but that MX in case b.
Example a makes the basic idea clear. In this economy there are six
states of nature and only two securities, yet markets are complete. This is
because the process of learning which of the six states is the true state
takes place not all at once but in three steps. Agents can revise their
portfolios after each step in the learning process. At each step, at most
two"signals"are possible. And the equilibrium prices of the two secur- Fig. 6
ities are "well behaved"—they are "linearly independent" in a fashion
that enables agents to take full advantage of new information as it is plete.
received, grout
canrn
6.4Genericity of the case M =Xwith K or more securities itles
K se
Condition (3.2) in proposition 2 can be viewed as two nested condi- anotFi
tions. First, the number of securities N must be at least as large as max(A possii
K(t,A) =K.In addition to this, the equilibrium prices must be "suf- struct
ficiently independent." In case b of the example, N =K(=2),but a set
because p(2, 03) and p(2, w5) are not independent, markets are not com- (Rt°/.81\
































;ecur- Fig. 6.Ia (lop) and b (bottom)
shion
S it is plete. This second part of (3.2) is less than satisfactory on economic
grounds, because it involves endogenous data, the equilibrium pricesp. It
cannot he completely dispensed with—not every set of K or more secur-
ities will have equilibrium prices that satisfy (3.2). Consider, for example,
K securities whose dividends at date T are scalar multiples of one
ondi- another. (That is, d,, =r,d1 forr,, E R.) But a result almost this strong is
lax,.A possible. Fix the economic setting; that is, fIx the state space. information
suf- structure, and agents. Suppose N securities are selected at "random." By
but a selection of N securities is meant a selection of a point d from the set
com- whichhereafter is denoted by D. A subset of D will be called
I214 David M. Kreps 215
sparse if its closure has Lebesgue measure zero. If the selection of d The set
done "randomly enough," there is zero probability that the outcome will clearly
land in a given sparse set. Following the terminology of Radner (1979), a
result that holds off of a sparse set is called generic. The next proposition
therefore gives the title of this section.
PropositiOn 3. Fix the economic setting. Suppose that if in this settinga
Debreu-style regime of complete contingent claims markets is set
then there is an equilibrium with equilibrium allocation {x'}. Then if N (R )
K,there is a sparse set in D such that for all d not in that set, the economy
with N long-lived securities paying d admits an equilibrium with M = x (R
andwith equilibrium allocation {x,}. dent 1s
Proof. In the Debreu-style economy, there is a linear functional: x For
Rthat is strictly positive and 'that satisfies
(4.1)E Xt,4(x') andx' ismaximal in {x E X:
(Thatis,4'givesthe equilibrium' prices.) Normalize4'sothat
•.,O))= 1. For t = 0,... ,Tand A Edefine Xt.A by
X,.A(5) = 0 for st and xt,A(t) =
That is, x,.A is the claim that pays one unit of consumption at date tin the
event A.
For any d E D, definep from dand 4'asfollows. Fort ￿ Tand w E fl, let
A Ebe such that oE A. Then let
(4.2) =
wE/S
Two things, once demonstrated, give the result. First, except ford from a
sparse subset of D, p so defined satisfies (3.2), and thus M = X. Second,
for all such d, the linear functional 'rr defined in (2.5) is 4'. (not
For the first result, it is necessary to show that except for d from a
sparse set, the set {p(t+ 1, w); oE A} contains K(t,A) linearly indepen-
dent vectors for every t and A ESince there are finitely many such pairs
(t,A) and since the union of a finite number of sparse sets is sparse, it
suffices to show that for every t and A the set of d E D for which the
corresponding {p(t+1,w); o E A} does not contain K(t,A) linearly








{I d('.o)cE(t+1,w);A'EF1±1,A'cA}. forc wEA
t.
J
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d The set of d for which this set of K(t,A) vectors is linearly dependent is
will clearly closed. That it has Lebesgue measure zero is also apparent as




ing a and let X denote Lebesgue measure on D. Then the measure XoYon
is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure
— becausethe a(t+ 1,w) are strictly positive. And the Lebesgue measure in
omy of vectors such that the are linearly depen-
— dentis zero, if N ￿ K.
For the second result, it suffices to show that for all strategies 0,
= 0. There is nothing to do but grind this out:
T— I




= + II 4(Xz.A)[0(t1,A)—
t=1AEF1
nthe





om a 10 (t,A)p(t+ 1,A')(x+ IA')] ond,
(note that dp(T))
.)m a





I 0(t,A).[0] = 0. QED
}can
:
Aremark may help the reader through this maze. If the security prices
p are to be the "same" asthen(4.2) is required. This can be seen as
follows. In the Debreu-style economy, forA E F a claim to dfllA (contin-
gent) units of consumption at date Tcosts units of
date zero consumption, or 1WEA A) units of date t,
event A consumption. If expectations are rational and an equilibrium is in
force, then this must be the price in units of date tconsumption of security
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n at date tin the event A. This is (4.2). As to the genericity of condition is
(3.2), the reader may find it helpful to take the economic structure of the That is,!
example, make up a set of equilibrium prices for a Debreu-style economy
with complete markets, and then see what is entailed in picking dso that p that ho
defined from (4.2) does not satisfy (3.2). ity, ass
Several remarks about this proposition and the previous analysis are
worth making. conditi
1. A by-product of the proposition is a result concerning the "generic there e:
existence of equilibrium": If N ￿ K and if the economic setting is such E Il, an
that an equilibrium exists with a Debreu-style regime of complete contin-
gent claims markets, then for all d except from a sparse subset of D, the
economy admits an equilibrium. for
2. The proposition does not show that for N ￿ K and generic d, all M =
equilibriaare Pareto efficient.It only shows that there are efficient
1
equilibria.But it seems likely that the stronger result is true, at least for
6 5 "most" economic settings.
3. The following result complementary to the proposition might be The
imagined: Fixingand for every d E D where N ￿ K the set of the mq
"communities of agents" that do not admit an equilibriumwhich M = With
Xis sparse among all communities of agents. The concept of a community (two)
of agents is ambiguous here, but what is intended is something like the
treatment in Radner (1979), where agents are parametrized by their in wh
subjective probability assessments. Such a result is impossible—as al- mode
ready noted, if the d,, are collinear and ahasmore than one state, then M A
=Xcannotresult. It is conjectured that the result is true, however, if this stand
and similar trivially pernicious choices of d are disallowed. (It seems The i
likely that thç technology developed in Radner (1979) would work excel- Brow
lently in this context.) that 4
4.In sections 6.2 through 6.4 it has been assumed that there is a single
perishable consumption good. It should be clear that the results given and
hold if there is a finite number of consumption goods, as long as there are thosi
spot markets in the consumption goods at each date and if securities pay E R i1
off in a good whose relative price is strictly positive in the date T spot date
market. tion
5.It has been assumed that all securities "live" from date zero to Tand such
that securities pay off only on date T. Clearly, the basic results do not pref
change if securities pay off on other dates as well and/or if securities live sive
for other sets of dates. The important thing is that for any time period Ito
1+ 1 and event A E F1, at least K(t,A) securities must be "alive." P(y'l
6. For the sake of completeness, a result from Harrison and Kreps
(1979) is repeated here. Suppose that one is given a state space fl, a time clainj
index set {O,...,T},an information structure {F1}, and a set of N securities
n=1,...,N}.Moreover, suppose that a price system p is given and it inst




































is claimed that p is the equilibrium price system for an economy as above.
That is, the claim is that there exists a population of agents meeting the
requirements above such that p is part of an equilibrium in the economy
that houses them. Under what conditions is this claim true? For simplic-
ity, assume that one of the securities, say, the first, pays out a strictly
positive amount in every state of nature. One necessary and sufficient
condition for an affirmative answer is that (2.3) is true. A second is that
there exists a probability measure QonIl such that Q({w})>0 for every w
Kand if E[.]denotesexpectation with respect to Q,then
1) F,] =
for every t < Tand n.(Also,p(T) must be proportional to d.) Moreover,
M =Xif and only if there exists exactly one such probability measure.
6.5The Black-Scholes Model
The Black-Scholes model is a continuous time, infinite state version of
the model in section 6.2 that comes to a similar and striking conclusion:
With a "simple enough" information structure, a small finite number
(two) of securities can span an infinite dimensional space of contingent
claims, owing to the infinite number of trading opportunities. The sense
in which this is true is not entirely straightforward, so a review of the
model is now presented.
A probability space (Q,F,P) is given. On this space is defined a
standard (mean zero, variance one) Brownian motion {B(t); t E [0, 1]).
The information available to agents at date t(t E [0,1]) is the history of the
Brownian motion up to that date: F, =F{B(u);0ut}. It is assumed
that FF1 as before.
For simplicity it will be assumed that agents consume only at dates zero
and one and that they have endowment of the consumption good only at
those dates.3 A consumption bundle is therefore a pair x =(r,y), wherer
E R is consumption at date zero and y is state contingent consumption at
date one, an F measurable real valued function. The space of consump-
tion bundles is denoted X =Rx Y and is assumed to be a linear space of
such pairs.4 Agents are described by a feasible net trade set X' ç X and a
preference ordering ￿' on X'. It is assumed that each X' is "comprehen-
sive upward" and that ￿' is strictly increasing in the following sense: If x'
=(r',y') KXis such that r' ￿ 0 andy' ￿ 0 P-as., and either r' >0 or
P(y' > 0) > 0, then for all x E X', x + x' E X' and x + x' >'x.
There are two long-lived securities in this world, which (as before) are
claims to date one consumption. The first yields er units of consumption
independent of the state, while the second yields exp {p. + aB(1,w)}units
in state w.(Here,r, p.,andir > 0 are given constants.) Trading in the two218 David M. Kreps 219 M
securities can take place at any date between zero and one (as better Havin€
information about the true state of the world is received), with relative an
equilibrium prices {p, (x', 0"
(5.1) p1(t) =eT'and p2(t) =exp{p.t+ crB(t)}. eachz,x
At date zero, the two securities and the consumption good are traded at of
relative prices one apiece. depends
In saying that these are equilibrium prices, the following is meant.
Given the price process p ={p(t)},agents seek to manage a portfolio of This is
the two securities so as to obtain the best possible net trade vector. A Black-Sd
trading strategy is formally represented as a vector stochastic process 0 conditiol
n =1,2,t E [0, 1]}, where represents the number of shares (1979),
of security n held at time t if the state is u. The obvious informational
constraint on 0 is that for every t, 0(t) must bemeasurable. But more tinuous
qualifications are necessary. One must say what sorts of trading strategies But if si
represent actions that agents are physically capable of. Moreover, be- To shov
cause no consumption takes place between dates zero and one, because difficult
agents' preferences are strictly increasing, and because (by assumption) sufficiet
agents do not receive fresh funds for investment between two dates, Take
any trading strategy 0 should be self-financing. That is to say, any changes result
in the composition of an agent's portfolio at dates t E (0, 1] should involve
zero net cost of transaction. Any purchases should be financed by a
corresponding sale, and the proceeds from any sale should be reinvested
elsewhere. (Date one is included in this constraint as it is imagined that
date one consumption takes place after date one markets close.)
One possibility is to say that agents can employ any strategy 0 such that it folio
t —*0,,(t,u)is of bounded variation for every n and a.e. w. Such 0 linear
correspond to trading strategies that have the representation: The
amount held at date t is the difference between a total amount bought
during [0, t] and an amount sold during that period. It is clear that such a That is
strategy 0 should be called self-financing if 0 =dO(t).p(t)for all t E (0,1].
In this case 0 yields the net trade vector x(0,p) =(r(0,p),y(0,p))given
by (for at
(5.2) r(0,p) =—O(O)'p(O)andy(0,p) =0(T).d. is ase
strate
A second, less generous possibility is to say that agents are capable of =x
employingonly simple trading strategies, defined as follows. A trading
I
strategy 0 is called simple if there exist a finite integer J and dates 0 =t0<
1 such that 0(t, w) is constant over intervals of the form t there
E Inwords, agents rearrange their portfolios only finitely many {p,(x'
times, where the number of times and the dates are fixed in advance. A cours
simple strategy 0 is self-financing if [0(t1) — 0for all j￿1,
in which case (5.2) gives x(0,p). (5.3)219 Multiperiod Securities and the Efficient Allocation of Risk
ietter Having defined what strategies agents are capable of, the definition of
lative an equilibrium proceeds exactly as before. An equilibrium is an ensemble
{p, (x',0i)} such that p(t) ismeasurable for all t, x' =x(01,p)E X' for
each i, x' ismaximal in {x(O,p)} fl X' for each i, and 0'=0.
Does the Black-Scholes model give prices which for some community
led at of agents are equilibrium prices in this sense? The answer to this question
depends on what trading strategies are allowed to agents. If bounded
teant, variation strategies as defined above are permitted, then the answer is no.
'ho of This is because there is a bounded variation strategy 0 such that forp the
or. A Black-Scholes prices, r(0,p) > 0 and y(O,p) ￿ 0 P-a.s. That is, the
•s o condition analogous to (2.3) does not hold. See Harrison and Kreps
hares (1979), section 6) for the basic idea. Note that this phenomenon is not
:ional peculiar to the Black-Scholes model. It occurs in virtually every con-
more tinuous time model with frictionless markets and two or more securities.
:egies But if simple trading strategies only are allowed, then the answer is yes.
be- To show this, show that (2.3) does hold in this case. (A direct proof is not
;ause difficult.) The discussion in Kreps (1981, section 6) shows that this is
tion) sufficient.
lates, Take then the case where only simple trading strategies are allowed. A
inges result analogous to proposition 1 is immediate. Defining
volv: M'=E X:xx(0,p) for a simple trading strategy 0},
M ={xE X:xm' + (r,0) for m' EM' and r ER}, and
tat 'rr(m' + (r,0)) =rform' EM' and rE R,
that it follows that Mis a subspace ofXand 'rr is a well-defined, strictly positive
.ch 0 linear functional on M. Moreover, if {p,(x',O')} is an equilibrium, then
The
ught E X' fl M, andx' is ￿' maximal in {x E X' fl M: ir(x)0}.
ich a That is, {x'} is an equilibrium allocation in a Debreu-style economy where
.'Ii claims in M can be bought at prices ii.
'iven Is this a "complete markets" equilibrium? It can be shown that M X
(for any reasonable choice of X), so the answer seems to be no. But there
is a sense in which the answer is yes. Suppose that X =Rx L2(11,F, P);
he strategies 0 must satisfy E L2(fI,F,P) for all tand n =1,2,X'
01 =Xfor each i, and each agent's preferences are continuous in the ding 2 Euclidean x L -norm product topology on X. Then following the results
)rrnt in Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Kreps (1981, especially theorem 5),
there exists a strictly positive linear functional t4X Rsuch that if lany
{p, (x', 0' )}isan equilibrium (where p are the Black-Scholes prices, of
1, course), then
(5.3) E {x E X' :4i(x)
LI220 David M. Kreps 221 M
(The linear functionalturnsout to be the unique continuous, strictly Now c
positive extension of ITfromM to all of X, and it is the uniqueness of this those in
extension that yields (5.3).) Index tht
This is the sense in which two long-lived securities can yield a complete securities
set of contingent claims for uncountably many contingencies if there are tion avail
infinitely many trading opportunities. One feels uneasy about both this each of ti
model and the conclusion arrived at on several grounds, among which are the equil
the following:
1. The restriction to simple trading strategies is unnatural. There are for all H,
other more natural ways to exorcise trading strategies that violate (2.3). for all h
For example, the requirement that O(t)'p(t) ￿— Lfor some finite L will Of cou
suffice for the Black-Scholes model. This can be interpreted as a credit (x'(H))
constraint. But no theory has been developed along these lines to the efficienc
author's knowledge. allocatio
2. The twin assumptions that each X' =Xand that each ￿'isEuclid- &(H) b
can x L2continuousarehardlypalatable. (Tosomeextent,theuseofthe 1)
L2 topology can be foregone. See Harrison and Kreps 1979, section 7.) It
would be nice to be able to widen the class of trading strategies so that M That is,
=Xand p is part of an equilibrium. The extant liteiature on the least as
Black-Scholes model, especially Merton (1977), suggests that the former zero. If
can be done by allowing trading strategies that are Ito integrals, and it has with x',
been conjectured by Harrison (1978) that the entire program is feasible if
a restricted class of Ito integrals is allowed. (6.2)
3. Most important is that no intuitive feeling has been developed for
why two securities suffice to give "complete markets" in this model, nor In
whether this result is generic in any sense. How does one generalize K to a agents
continuous time setting, and why (if a generalization is possible) does K at least
=2in this case? The proof of theorem 3 in Harrison and Kreps (1979) is then
the key step in obtaining the result that markets are "complete" in the Proj
Black-Scholes model, and in that proof the key step is the use of the the eq
remarkable result of Kunita and Watanabe (1967) that every martingale (6.3)
on the Brownian information structure can be written as a stochastic
integral of Brownian motion. Intuitive comprehension of that result is then ii
necessary if one is to feel comfortable using the Black-Scholes model. Proc
Kreps
unfam
6.6A Convergence Result Wit]
Begin with the following pieces of the Black-Scholes model: (1l,F,P),
[O,1]};afmnitecollectionofagentswithX' =X=Rx L2(11,F,P) case ((
and preferences that are Euclidean XL2continuous and strictly increas-
It WI
ing.Assume that if these agents are placed in a Debreu-style economy a sequ
with a complete set of contingent claims markets, then the linear func- atat
tional : R that is introduced in section 6.5 is an equilibrium set of (6.4)
prices, with corresponding equilibrium allocation (x').
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strictly Now consider placing these agents in a sequence of economies like
of this those in section 6.2 except that Il as above remains fixed and so is infinite.
Index the economies by H =1,2,...In economy H, trading in two
mplete securities takes place at the H +Idates t= 0,1/H,...,1.The informa-
ere are don available at date h/H is Fh,H(forF, as above), and thus "K = in
)th this each of these economies. Let H); fl 1,2,t =0,1/H,...,} denote
tich are the equilibrium prices in economy H, and let (x'(H)) denote the corre-
sponding equilibrium allocation. Assume for simplicity that d1(H) =er
ere are forall H, so thatp1(t;H) >Oforall(and Hby (2.3), andthatp1(O;H) =1
(2.3). for all H.
L will Of course, in economy Hit is not true that M =X.Thus, the allocation
icredit (x'(H)) may be Pareto inefficient. To measure the degree of this in-
to the efficiency, the allocations (x'(H)) will be compared with the efficient
allocation (x'). Write x'(H) =(r'(H),y'(H))and x'(r',y').Define
Euclid- 6i(H)by
the (6.1) 61(H)= inf{6>0:(r'(H)+
n7.)It
that M That is, x'(H) augmented by &(H) units of date zero consumption is at
on the least as good as x'. If agent i prefers x'(H) to x', then is set equal to
former zero. If no 6 can be found to make i better off with x'(H) +(6,0)than




el, nor In words, zX(H) units of date zero consumption can be distributed among
Kto a agents after they trade to equilibrium in economy H so that each agent is
loes K at least as well off as in the efficient allocation (x'). If is "small,"
979) is then economy H is "nearly" efficient.
in the Proposition 4. Let {p(t); tE[0, 1J} be the Black-Scholes price system. If
of the the equilibrium prices {p(t;H)} converge to {p(t)} in the sense that
tingale (6.3)lim p2(t;H)/PL(t;H)=p2(t)/p1(t)in L2 uniformly in t,
:hastic H—'.'
is then =0.
Proof. (This proof makes heavy use of the technology of Harrison and
Kreps 1979 and Kreps 1981, and it is probably unintelligible to readers
unfamiliar with those papers.)
Without loss of generality, it can be assumed that r =0and p1(t)
F,P), p1(t;H)1 for all H. (See Harrison and Kreps 1979, section 7.) In this
,F,P) case (6.3) becomes: =p2(t)in L2 uniformly in r.
creas- It will suffice to show that for every x E Xsuch that￿0there exists
a sequence of (self-financing) trading strategies 0(H) that involve trading
func- at dates 0,1/H,... ,1 only and a sequence {x(H)} ç X such that
set of (6.4)x(0(H),p(H)) ￿x(H) for every H, and lirnx(H) =x.222 David M. Kreps
(Limits in X are always in the Euclidean xproduct topology.) Forif (by iterati
this is true for all x, it is true in particular for x'. Thus, as H gets large, it
feasible in economy H for agent ito obtain an x'(O(H),p(H)) which isat
feast as good as some x(H) which in turn is close in terms of ￿' to x'.
(Recall the continuity of Byrevealed preference, x(H) (since
x(8'(H),p(H)), and thus 0as H
Fixx E X. From Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Kreps (1981)is
known that there exist simple trading strategies O(€) that are self.
financing forp and x(e) (e =1,2,...)such that
(6.5) x(O(e),p)￿x(e)foreveryeand urn x(e)=x. For Hlai
02(t1)fot
In Harrison and Kreps (1979), such 0 are assumed to satisfy the condition argumet
E L2 for each t and n. But in fact one can add the condition that y(OH•,p(
02(t) Efor all t, and still there exist 0(e) and x(e) as in (6.5). (To see portiorn
this, review the proof of theorem 2 in Harrison and Kreps 1979 with this d% d1
additional condition on simple trading strategies, and verify that it re-
mains a valid proof.) For the remainder of this proof, simple trading
strategies will be assumed to satisfy this additional condition.
Let 0 be any simple trading strategy that is self-financing for p. Define
from 0 a trading strategy 0" (for economy H) by the first
=02(h/H)forh=0,...,H,0ç1(0) =01(0),and t<1IJl
0'11(t) fort>0 defined so that 0" is self-financing for {p (t; H)}. Prop
Note that if 0 changes values at dates 0 =t0< t1 <...<j1, then (oo vers
changes values at datestv,...where fort E [0,1], tt' =inf{u￿ in itsell
u =h/Hfor some integer h}. maklnf
To show that (6.4) is true, it will suffice to show that for any simple 0 much
are Str4 (self-financing for p),
way in
(6.6) lim x(0",p(H)) =x(0,p). equilib
make
For this combined with (6.5)yields(6.4) by an easy argument. To show be to t
(6.6), note firstthat =0(0)and therefore r(0",p(H)) = equilil
—0(0).p(0;H). Since F0 istrivial, the constant p(0;H) p(O)by and th
assumption, and thus r(0",p(H)) —*—O(O)'p(O)=r(0,p).Next note equilil
that pay of
y(O,p) =0(1).d=0(t1).d = —p(tj)] +0(tj)'p(tj) and
the ser
=0(t1)'[d—p(tj)J+ 0(t1_ i)p(tj) strong
(because 0 is p self-financing) A iii
=0(tj)[d—p(tj)]+ 0(tj_1)'[p(tj) —p(tj_i)] + O(tj_1)'p(tj_1)
= -p(tj)]+ 1 - +223 Multiperiod Securities and the Efficient Allocation of Risk
For (by iterating the above argument)
= 02(tJ) [d2 -P2(tJ)1+ - p2(tJ)1+ O(O).p(O)
itoxi. .
U) (since d1p1(t)1). Similarly,
= +
1) it is f—i
e self- —p2(t11';H)] +
For H large enough that t1 +— 1/Hfor allj, it follows that Oq(t7) =
92(o)forall j.Byassumption, 02(t) E for allt, and by previous
argument, O(O).p(O) = limH Thus, y(O,p) = limH
n that y(0'1,p(h1)) follows from limH d2(H) = d2 in L2 (note that d is pro-
To see portional top(1) and d(H) is proportional top(1;H), and by assumption
ith this d1d1(H)1), and
t it re- tim [p2(t";H) —p2(t)J = urn [p2(t";H)_p2(H)1 +
:rading
lim [p2(1") —p2(t)]= 0 + 0 = 0 in L2 uniformly in 1,
Define
the first by the hypothesis of the proposition and the second because t" —
<1/H and geometric Brownian motion is L2 uniformly continuous.
QED.
Proposition 4 shows that it is possible to have K much larger than N
hen 0H (xversus2), and yet equilibrium allocations are "nearly" efficient. This
{u in itself is not remarkable—Wilson (1968) shows that this is possible by
making strong assumptions concerning agents' preferences. But here
mple o much weaker assumptions about preferences are made. Instead, there
are strong assumptions on the ability to trade securities frequently, the
way in which uncertainty resolves, and the approximate behavior of
equilibrium security prices. It would be preferable, of course, not to
make assumptions about equilibrium prices. A possible direction would
) show be to take as given 11, F, P, and agents, assume that i.fiX—+ R gives
1))= equilibrium prices for a Debreu-style economy with complete markets,
(0) by and then show that (1) for each H, or for H sufficiently large, there is an
•t note equilibrium in the long-lived securities economy with two securities that
pay off exactly (or approximately) what the Black-Scholes securities pay,
and (2) these equilibrium prices converge to the Black-Scholes prices in
the sense of (6.3). But even if this is true, it is a result predicated on very
strong assumptions.
A number of extensions can be obtained cheaply. The reliance on the
, exactdistributions of the Black-Scholes price processes is unnecessary—
the methodology works for any diffusion process covered by theorem 3 in
Harrison and Kreps (1979). This includes, for more than two securities,
diffusions. The diffusion assumption is not particularly
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necessary, except insofar as it is a case where "markets are complete" H(hi
the limit. Other stochastic processes, such as the jump process modelof
Pt
Cox and Ross (1976), could be used. Finally, the use of the spaceof (No mat
square integrable claims and the L2 topology is not necessary—see the enough
discussion in Harrison and Kreps (1979, section 7). Of course, if prefer all'suffic
ences are continuous in another topology, then (6.3) will have to be Becau
modified appropriately, for large
It is worth noting that what is a flaw in the Black-Scholes model, like"
namely, the need to restrict attention to simple trading strategies, be. H goes
comes a virtue here. If one takes the view (implicit in proposition 4) that Scholes
the Black-Scholes model is to be regarded as an ideal approximation to that as
economies with many, but only finitely many, trading dates, then the pareto
restriction makes sense. In the "limit" economy, agents should not be Prop
able to employ strategies that cannot be approximated (in terms of unlike t
preference), by strategies available in the economies approaching the Since
limit. The trading strategies of bounded variation that turn nothing into fore so
one unit of consumption do not pass this test for agents of the sort evidenc
discussed here. So from this perspective, these strategies can reasonably the Bla
be excluded from the set of strategies available in the Iiqiit economy. cesses
prices
6.7Extending the Convergence Result
Perhaps the least satisfactory aspect of proposition 4 is that in it, fl, F, the P, {F}, and the agents do not change along the sequence. A more Pareto1
satisfactory treatment of the problem would cover the following example. ButI
Fix a positive integer H and imagine an economy withstates of'
1A
nature.Every state o has H coordinates ..,WH) whereeachtakes an
on one of three possible values: —2; 0; 2. Think of each Whasbeing econo
determined by an independent experiment, where the probabilities of the agents
outcomes 2 and —2 are ½ apiece and the probability of outcome 0 is ¾. domai
Letdenotethis state space and p" this probability measure on In as:
this economy, agents consume at dates zero and one and trade at dates
=0,1/H,...,1.The information available at date h/H, denoted is (7.1)
the a-field generated by the first h coordinates of the state. (That is, at
date h/H the first h coordinates of the state have been revealed to agents.)
Note that this yields K =3.There are two securities traded in this 2.
economy, paying the following dividends at date one:
=er and = exp w,,)/V71 + (7.2)
Here w =(w1 WH),andr,anda> 0 are given constants. These are
traded together with the consumption good at date zero at relative prices This one apiece. The two securities are also traded for each other at dates pH)
1/H,...,1with relative equilibrium pricesw) = andpq (h/H, w) =exp (ig)I V11+ph/H].
(No matter what values r, p., and cr take on as long as a- > 0, for large
enough H these prices are equilibrium prices for some agents. That is, for
all sufficiently large H they satisfy (2.3).)
Because K3 and N =2,this economy has incomplete markets. Yet
for large H, the equilibrium price system in this economy is "very much
like" the Black-Scholes price system. A more precise statement is that as
H goes to infinity, the price systemsconverge weakly to the Black-
Scholes price system (in the sense of Billingsley Does this imply
that as H goes to infinity, the equilibrium allocations are asymptotically
Pareto efficient?
Proposition 4 offers no concrete guidance on this question. Here,
unlike there, as H changes so do state spaces and information structures.
Since the state spaces change, so must the commodity spaces, and there-
fore so must the agents. There is a sense in which proposition 4 offers
evidence that the answer to this question is yes: It is possible to define on
the Black-Scholes probability space a sequence of vector stochastic pro-
cesses {13h1'(h/H);h =0,...,H}that have the same distribution as the
processes {p11(h/H)} given above and that converge to the Black-Scholes
prices in the sense of (6.3).6 Therefore, if for large H one seeks to
approximate in M'(H) (the set of budget feasible net trades in economy
H) the individual agents' parts of an allocation that is budget feasible at
the Black-Scholes prices (on the presumption that one such allocation is
Pareto efficient), then proposition 4 suggests that this is possible.
Butfor a number of reasons, the quality of this evidence is low.
1. As noted above, the agents must change with H. In what sense can
an allocation from the Black-Scholes economy be Pareto efficient for
economy H? There can be no sense in which this is true, because for
agents in economy H, their piece of any such allocation does not lie in the
domain of their preferences. What would make sense is a statement such
as:
(7.1) In economy H there is a Pareto efficient allocation (x'(H))E
(X(H))' such that as H goes to infinity, each x'(H) is approximated
by some bundle from M'(H).
2. Assuming that (7.1) is to be sought, how is the notion of "approxi-
mate" to be formalized? Proposition 4 suggests the following:
(7.2) For each x'(H) =(r'(H),y'(H))there exists (s'(H),z'(H))E
M'(H) such thatlimH...,,,, — + —
z'(H))2]}=0.
This type of criterion worked in proposition 4 because the agents (and
pH)did not change with H, and the agents' preferences were assumed
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continuous and their net trade sets open in the corresponding tOPology Since
Thus, from (7.2) it was easy to conclude that —pØ•Here, because expect
agents change with H, (7.2) alone will not suffice to guarantee "asympto. contini'
tic efficiency," even if every agents' preferences are Euclidean >(U eral (7
continuous. An assumption of equicontinuity (measured in dateZero being
consumption) will clearly be required. That is, as H changes the agent Pareto
who "plays role i" in economy H cannot be varying too wildly with H in that in
terms of the continuity of his preferences. to assu
3. Assume that (7.1) is to be sought, formalized as in (7.2). This beoffe
general will be false. Because agents change with H, the allocation pie
(x'(H)) that is being "chased" may change with H sufficiently quickly to functii
frustrate convergence. (This was not a problem in proposition 4 because be giv
there a single unchanging allocation was being chased.) For example, expect
suppose that for efficiency in economy H it is necessary to trade the tjonal
contingent claim y(H) given by I
(. LJ\ — — ( H—at
Thus,
Trade in this claim would be necessary for efficiency if, for example, two on m
agents disagreed about the probability distribution of WI,evenif they econo
agreed about all other probabilities. It can be shown that for this claim showi
y(H) there does noteexist z(H) E Y(H) such that for some s(H), inforr
(s(H),z(H)) E M'(H) and on fin
(7.3) lirn —z(H))2]=0.
and(
Thus, if these claims appear in the allocations (x'(H)) being chased, (7.2) ture
cannot hold. (A g
Compare this with the following situation. Suppose that for efficient ing t
allocation in economy H only the following two claims are required (in
addition to those in M(H)): Th
asfol y'(o;H) =sup{exp[I =0,...,H} imati
and thing
y"(w;H) = — with
For these claims the statement corresponding to (7.3) is true, and there is abov
some hope that (7.2) may prove to be true.
What distinguishes y'(H) and y"(H) fromy(H)? Why does (7.3) hold
6 8 for the first two and not the third? Recall that the price systems p"
converge to the Black-Scholes prices in a very coarse fashion, in the weak
topology.7 The claims y'(H) and y"(H) depend on the state only via few
"coarse" features of the price history. More precisely, they are given by fecti'
weak topology continuous functions of prices.8 This is not true of the whic
claims y(H). They depend on the "fine features" of the price history. marl
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)Ology. Since convergence takes place in the weaktopology, it is reasonable to
expect that at best sequences of claims corresponding to weak topology
ympto- continuous functions will be approximated by marketed claims. In gen-
><L2 eral, (7.1) and (7.2) will be false, unless (perhaps) the allocations (x'(H))
te zero being chased "settle down" in this fashion. Since (x'(H)) is meant to be a
agent Pareto efficient allocation for the agents in economy H, it seems likely
th H in that in order to ensure that the (x'(H)) "settle down" it will be necessary
to assume that agents "settle down." (No general formulation of this can
This in be offered here. But the reader may wish to ponder the following exam-
I)Cation ple that seems to work: For i =1,...,1fix real numbers a1 and a
ckly to function u': R x R —+R.In economy H, let agent i's preferences for (r,y)
ecause be given by the index Eti[ut(r,aldq(w)+ y(w))J. Thatis, agents are
ample, expected utility maximizers whose date one endowments are propor-
de the tional shares of the second security.)
4. In proposition 4 the information structure does not change with
H—at time h/H agents possess all the Brownian information to that date.
Thus, in the proposition, trading strategies 0 can have 0(h/H) depending
le, two on more than the history of prices up to time h/H. In the sequence of
if they economies given above, this extra information isavailable. It can be
claim shown in the setting of proposition 4 that for some claims this extra
s(H), information is extraneous: For a claim whose value depends continuously
on finitely many values of prices, (6.4) remains true when agents can base
portfolio holdings on past price information only. This suggests that with
some further restrictions on the allocations (x'(H)) being chased, (7.1)
(7 2' and (7.2) will not be rendered false by the changing information struc-
ture. But what those restrictions are in general remains an open question.
(A good place to start is probably with the work of Aldous 1978 concern-
ing the relation between weak convergence a Ia Billingsley 1968 and
"convergence of information.")
The somewhat disjointed discussion of this section can be summarized
as follows. Proposition 4 is a first step toward a general theory of approx-
imation of the sort discussed in the introduction. But it takes too many
things as fixed. A more satisfactory theory would subsume the example
with which this section began. Proposition 4 suggests that such a theory




weak To sum up what has been said: Frequent trading makes it possible for a
.ly via few securities to span many states of nature. Whether markets are "per-
by fectly" complete depends critically on the fine structure of the way in
of the which uncertainty resolves. But the condition required for complete
markets is not "nearly" required for "approximately" complete markets.
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Ifequilibrium prices approximate an ideal model in a fairly coarse sense and Subr
and if that ideal model has perfectly complete markets, then markets in arise.
the original model will give nearly efficient equilibrium allocations. Thus, (see Grd
if actual security prices behave "like" those in the Black-Scholes model short
(meaning here the general class of diffusion process models for which 4.StiLt.
markets are complete), risk is allocated approximately efficiently. Scholes
A number of caveats to this argument have already been noted. The purpose
the second half of the paper relies on unpalatable assumptions suspect.
concerning agents' net trade sets and preferences. The approximation tions of
analysis takes equilibrium prices as exogenously given, which is certainly transact
an unhappy state of affairs. And the approximation result that is derived be a pla
is preliminary at best—a more satisfactory theory will require qualifica- "standa
tionsthatmay turn out to be unpalatable. To this list the following more CBOE
general caveats should be added: here.
1. The final conclusion given above rests on a very large supposition.
Do actual security prices behave (even coarsely) "like" those in the
Black-Scholes model? One can point to incidents where sudden bits of Note news have caused security prices to jump discontinuously, which the
Black-Scholes prices do not do. In Merton (1976) it is argued that such 1.Best
jumpsmay be unimportant for the efficient allocation of risk because they thepets
maybe "diversifiable" components of uncertainty. But to make this
argument, it is at least necessary to assume that agents hold portfolios 2.
thatare "diversified" enough to make such risk negligible. This in turn placedo
requiresstrong assumptions on preferences. Moreover, "Continuous willnot
samplepaths" are not (as is sometimes naively believed) sufficient for expectal
Black-Scholestype behavior: Harrison (1978) observes that if prices act pomt,ti
inprecisely the Black-Scholes model except that the diffusion coefficient
changes with, say, the political party of the occupant of the White House ences
(andif itis impossible to make book on the results of presidential differen
elections),then sample paths are continuous yet markets are not corn- 3.
plete.The question of whether prices do behave approximately like
Black-Scholesprices (even coarsely) is very difficult, and nothing here story.i
shouldbe construed as an assertion that they do. 5.T
2.For efficient allocation of risk, all uncertainty must be "spanned."
In the Black-Scholes model, the only uncertainty is security price uncer- process
tainty.But phenomena such as differential information, moral hazard, theore
individualuncertainty about future tastes, etc., represent uncertainty the ainos'4
resolution of which is not reflected (completely) in any security price. At then1
best,there are complete markets only in uncertainty which is so reflected. each
3..Adding production decisions to the story causes major difficulties.
Afirm contemplating a new and uncertain production process cannot
(necessarily) observe prices for claims contingent on the outcome of that purpos
uncertainty—theproblems addressed in the "spanning" literature (Di- convel
amond1967; Stiglitz 1972; Ekern and Wilson 1974; Leland 1974; Merton proble
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:e sense and Subrahmanyam 1974; Radner 1974; Grossman and Stiglitz 1980) all
rkets in arise. Note that adding firms is "easy" only when they are "competitive"
Thus, (see Grossman and Stiglitz 1980), and Hart (1979) indicates that with
model short sales, "competitive" firms will be difficult to find.
which 4.Still, suppose security prices do behave "nearly" like the Black-
y. Scholes prices. Then at least, it seems, markets are "nearly" complete for
The purposes of pure exchange in the security price uncertainty. Even this is
nptions suspect. The arguments used here put tremendous strain on the assump-
mat ion tions of rational expectations and zero transaction costs. In a world with
transactions costs and even slightly "irrational" expectations, there will
ierived be a place for markets where agents can purchase at the outset sundry
talifica.. "standard" packages of claims contingent on security price histories. The




bits of Notes ich the
at such 1. Besides these two seminal papers, the following make significant contributions from
se they the perspective taken here: Cox and Ross (1976), 1-larrison and Kreps (1979), Kreps (1981),
ke this Mertori (1977), and Ross (1978). Smith (1976) provides a survey of the literature through
1976. Diffusion models were introduced into financial theory in Merton (1971 and 1973a).
. . . . .
2.Two technical points are worth making. First, unlike in Radner (1972), no bound is
in turn placed onthe magnitude of 9. This is not necessary here, as general existence of equilibria
inuous will not be an issue. Second, the definition of an equilibrium of plans. prices, and price
for expectations presumes that agents will carry out plans that they embark on (or, more to the
ces act point, they believe that they will carry them out). Implicit in this is art "unchanging tastes"
assumption, which can be used to motivate restrictions on preferences, notably weak
separability across states. See Donaldson, Rossman, and Selden (1978). If agents' prefer-
ences "changed" in the sense of Hammond (1976), the analysis here would be significantly
iential different.
corn- 3. See Harrison and Kreps (1979, section 7) for a discussion of this restriction.
ly like 4.If y =y'P-as., then y and y' are assumed to be indistinguishable as time one
o here contingent claims. Note that for the first time the probability measure P has entered the
story. It will continue to do so, and the reader should note where and how it does.
5. To be more formal about this, define =and = for tE
Ined. ' [h/H,(h+1)/H).Then weak convergence in D2[O, 1] (with the Skorohod topology) to the
uncer- process given in (5.1) follows from Donsker's theorem and the Continuous mapping
azard, theorem. See Billingsley (1968) for definitions and details.
tty the 6. More generally, a theorem of Skorohod (1956) ensures that weak convergence and
A almostsure convergence are compatible in roughly this sense: If p(H) converges weakly to
ce. 4-it thenthere exists a probability space on which are defined processes j5(H) andj3 such that
has the same distribution asp(H) and j3 has the same distribution asp, and1.3(H)
ulties. converges a. s. to j3. Note that the convergence criterion in (6.3) is neither necessary nor
annot sufficient for almost sure convergence in the Skorohod topology on D2[O, 1]. Moreover,
,fthat replacing (7.3) by a.s. convergence in the Skorohod topology would be insufficient for
e purposes here, for roughly the same reason that a. s. convergence does not imply L"
i.I convergence for random variables. Therefore, in a general treatment of the convergence
erton problem, convergence iii the weak topology would not be the "correct" criterion.
j.230 David M. Kreps 2311
7. Caveat emptor: As noted above in note 6, convergence in the weak topology is apt to Guesne1
turn out to be too weak a criterion for the results being sought. Throughout this section, the plans
weak topology is used for purposes of discussion, to indicate the general sort of convergence) u d topology that one would like to use in extending proposition 4. n er
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